「International Rivalry in FDI Incentives and Strategic Responses」
●저자 : 강문성
●학술지명 : 무역연구
●권호 : 18(1)
●게재년월 : 2022년 2월
●링크: https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART002817992
[초록]
Purpose – As globalization continues to expand since the 1990s,
competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) has intensified all over the
world. This paper tried to explore strategic relationships among developing
countries in a race to attract multinational corporations (MNCs).
Design/Methodology/Approach – This study established a game-theoretical model
with three stages, where governments of potential host countries set their
policies to attract MNCs and impose a tariff on imported products. In addition,
MNCs make their own locational decision after realizing policy sets of
incentives and tariffs. Findings – This paper found that an MNC will make a
locational decision considering market size, cost advantages, FDI incentives,
and tariff burdens. This paper also found that countries with a smaller market
size and a weaker cost advantage are likely to raise FDI incentives to attract
MNCs. In addition, the host country will raise the FDI subsidy when a non-host
rival country sets a higher tariff on exports of the host country. We also
found that the non-host country, which lost the race of attracting the MNC,
will raise its optimal tariff rate if it has a bigger market, and the host
country has a weaker cost advantage. In addition, the non-host country will raise
the optimal tariff rate when the host country provides a greater subsidy to the
MNC. Research Implications – One of critical findings in this study is that the
host country has no first-mover advantage in a race of FDI subsidies because it
needs to provide a greater subsidy to attract the MNC when it moves first by
providing FDI subsidies, and then the non-host country will react by imposing a
tariff against the exports of the host country to the market of the non-host
country.